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The Ivory Tower at Ground Zero:




If timidity in the face of government overreaching is the academy's
overarching historical narrative,, responses to September ii broke the mold.
In what I will call the first generation of Guantinamo issues, members of
the legal academy mounted a vigorous campaign against the unilateralism
of Bush Administration policies.2 However, the landscape has changed in
Guantdnamo's second generation, which started with the Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Boumediene v. Bush,3 affirming detainees' access to
habeas corpus, and continued with the election of Barack Obama. Second
generation Guantdnamo issues are murkier, without the clarion calls that
marked first generation fights. This Article identifies points of substantive and
methodological convergence4 in the wake of Boumediene and President Obama's
election. It then addresses the risks in the latter form of convergence.
Substantive points of convergence that have emerged include a consensus
on the lawfulness of detention of suspected terrorists subject to judicial reviews
and a more fragile meeting of the minds on the salutary role of constraints
generally and international law in particular. However, the promise of
Peter Margulies is Professor of Law, Roger Williams University.
I. See Sarah H. Ludington, The Dogs that Did Not Bark: The Silence of the Legal Academy
During World War II, 6o J. Legal Educ. 396 (2oio) (discussing the relative quiescence of
legal scholars during the Japanese-American internment and other threats to civil liberties).
2. For a discussion of those policies, see Peter Margulies, Law's Detour: Justice Displaced in
the Bush Administration (NYU Press 2010). An important early example of opposition
to those policies is Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt:
Trying the Military Tribunals, iii Yale L.J. 1259 (2002) (arguing that President Bush lacked
authority to unilaterally establish military commissions).
3. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
4. For a discussion of convergence in paradigms for the arrest, detention, and adjudication of
suspected terrorists, see Robert Chesney &Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence
of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 6 o Stan. L. Rev. 1079 (2008).
5. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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substantive consensus is marred by the peril of a methodological convergence
that I call dominant doctrinalism. Too often, law school pedagogy and
scholarship squint through the lens of doctrine, inattentive to the way that
law works in practice.' Novel doctrinal developments, such as the president's
power to detain United States citizens or persons apprehended in the United
States, get disproportionate attention in casebooks and scholarship. In
contrast, developments such as an expansion in criminal and immigration
law enforcement that build on settled doctrine get short shrift, even though
they have equal or greater real-world consequences. Consumers of pedagogy
and scholarship are ill-equipped to make informed assessments or push for
necessary changes. If legal academia is to respond adequately to second
generation Guantinamo issues, as well as issues raised by any future attacks, it
must transcend the fascination with doctrine displayed by both left and right,
and bolster its commitment to understanding and changing how law works
"on the ground."
To combat dominant doctrinalism and promote positive change, this
Article asks for greater attention in three areas. First, law schools should do
even more to promote clinical and other courses that give students first-hand
experience in advocacy for vulnerable and sometimes unpopular clients,
including the need for affirming their clients' humanity and expanding the
venue of advocacy into the court of public opinion.7 Clinical students also
often discover with their clients that legal rights matter, although chastened
veterans of rights battles like Joe Margulies and Hope Metcalf are correct that
victories are provisional and sometimes pyrrhic.8 Second, legal scholarship
and education should encourage the study of social phenomena like path-
dependence-the notion that past choices frame current advocacy strategies,
so that lawyers recommending an option must consider the consequences of
push-back from that choice. Aggressive Bush Administration lawyers unduly
discounted risks flagged by more reflective colleagues on the consequences of
push-back from the courts. Similarly, both the new Obama Administration and
advocates trying to cope with Guantinamo's post-Boumediene second generation
failed to gauge the probability of push-back from the administration's early
announcement of plans to close the facility within a year. In each case,
6. This is, of course, not a new critique; on the interaction of socio-political and legal
developments from a Critical Legal Studies perspective, see Robert W. Gordon, Critical
Legal Histories, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 57, 103-14 (1984).Judges have weighed in as well; see Harry
T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession,
91 Mich. L. Rev. 34 (1992).
7. On the importance of affirming a client's humanity, see Stephen Ellmann, Empathy and
Approval, 43 Hastings L.J. 991 (1992). For a discussion of mobilizing broader audiences in
advocacy for corporate clients, see Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of
Public Opinion, Installment One: Broadening the Role of Corporate Attorneys, 22 Geo.J.
Legal Ethics 1259 (2009).
8. SeeJoseph Margulies & Hope Metcalf, Terrorizing Academia, 6oJ. Legal Educ. 433 (2010).
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unexpected but reasonably foreseeable reactions skewed the implementation
of legal and policy choices. Students should learn more about these dynamics
before they enter the legal arena.
Third, teachers need to focus more on ways in which bureaucratic structures
affect policy choices. For example, terrorism fears gave conservative politicians
like John Ashcroft an opportunity to decimate asylum adjudication, harming
many victims of persecution who have been unable to press meritorious
claims for refugee status and other forms of relief. Similarly, creation of the
Department of Homeland Security turned a vital governmental function
like disaster relief into a bureaucratic orphan, thereby paving the way for the
inadequate response to Hurricane Katrina. Students need more guidance on
what to look for when structure shapes substance.
The Article is in three parts. Part I discusses substantive convergences on
issues like detention and international law. Part II analyzes the problems posed
by dominant doctrinalism, including the neglect of important criminal law
issues in counterterrorism. Part III outlines suggestions that would temper
doctrinalism's impact by encouraging engagement with the realities of legal
practice.
I. Substantive Convergence
While reports of an overarching consensus on counterterrorism law are
premature, marked convergence has emerged, particularly as the Supreme
Court declared off-limits the stark uses of presidential power that the Bush
Administration deployed in the immediate aftermath of the September
ii attacks. Convergence is evident on the specific issue of detention (with
appropriate judicial review). Hints of a more provisional consensus have also
emerged on the desirability of legal constraints on the president and the nature
of international law. I consider each in turn.
A. Detention: Common Ground and a Residue ofDisagreement
The academy started out solidly arrayed against the Bush Administration's
highhanded assertion of power to indefinitely detain suspected terrorists
without judicial review.9 Some academics argued that such detention was
categorically inappropriate. o Others suggested that the administration's flaws
9. For a critique of the former administration's position, see Margulies, Law's Detour, supra note
2, at 16-17. Scholarly supporters of the administration's positions, some of whom worked for
the administration at one time or another, included Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Terror
in the Balance: Security, Liberty, and the Courts 275 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (arguing
that legal constraints on national security decisionmaking are usually counterproductive
and institutionally flawed); John Yoo, War by Other Means: An Insider's Account of the
War on Terror (Atlantic Monthly Press 2oo6) (arguing for virtually unfettered presidential
power).
to. See Margulies and Metcalf, supra note 8 (implicitly taking this position, although not
defending it); see also Gabor Rona, An Appraisal of U.S. Practice Relating to "Enemy
Combatants," io Y.B. Int'l Humanitarian L. 232 (2009) (arguing that law of war prohibits
most detention of individuals associated with Taliban or Al Qaeda).
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concerned the absence ofjudicial review, and the failure to consult Congress.'
In significant ways, the Supreme Court settled much of the debate, requiring
judicial review" and congressional buy-in.'3 After the Supreme Court's
decisions and the election of President Obama, a common-sense consensus
has emerged.
Progressive scholars, including Georgetown's David Cole, have
acknowledged that the United States has authority to detain members of Al
Qaeda and the Taliban, subject to judicial review.14 Cole endorsed a narrower
scope for the detention power than others suggest. However, the underlying
basis for the power is accepted by a significant number of scholars across the
spectrum. For progressives, this is in part a pragmatic calculation: Cole has
argued that a categorical or absolutist argument against detention authority
would "have the perverse effect of encouraging states to use lethal force, or to
seek to act outside the law without even the safeguards that accompany wartime
detention."'5 However, Cole has also endorsed detention as a necessary step
for effective counterterrorism policy, acknowledging that barring detention
ii. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb-A
Constitutional History, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941 (2oo8) (offering defense of heightened role
for Congress and the courts); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil
Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights
During Wartime, in The Constitution in Wartime: Beyond Alarmism and Complacency 161
(Duke Univ. Press Books 2005).
12. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (striking down restrictions on habeas corpus).
For commentary on the case, see Baher Azmy, Executive Detention, Boumediene, and the
New Common Law of Habeas, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 445 (2010) (analyzing the decision's role in
safeguarding the separation of powers); David Cole, Rights Over Borders: Transnational
Constitutionalism and Guantainamo Bay, 2oo8 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 47 (decision helps restore
rule of law); Jared A. Goldstein, Habeas Without Rights, 2007 Wis. L. Rev. ni65 (viewing
habeas as check on political branches); Joseph Landau, Muscular Procedure: Conditional
Deference in the Executive Detention Cases, 84 Wash. L. Rev. 661 (2009) (procedural
rulings in terrorism cases guide interaction between the branches); but see Eric A. Posner,
International Law and the War on Terror: Boumediene and the Uncertain March ofJudicial
Cosmopolitanism, 2008 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 23, 39-46 (courts err in not extending greater
deference to executive decisions about national security and foreign affairs).
13. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding that president lacked authority to
unilaterally establish military commissions that lacked safeguards required by Congress); cf
Stephen I. Viadeck, Foreign Affairs Originalism in Youngstown's Shadow, 53 St. Louis U. L.
J. 29, 35-37 (2008) (discussing relationship between Hamdan and historical understanding
of separation of powers).
14. See David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War,
97 Cal. L. Rev. 693, 732-40 (2009). President Obama has also endorsed the detention subject
to judicial review as one of three approaches to incapacitation and adjudication of cases
involving suspected terrorists. See Remarks by President Barack Obama, Protecting Our
Security and Our Values, May 21, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press.
office/Remarks-by-the-President-O n-National-Security-5-21-0 9 / (discussing relationship
between criminal prosecution, military commissions, and detention under laws of war).
15. See Cole, supra note 14, at 695-96.
376
7he Ivory Tower at Ground Zero
and requiring the government to charge suspected terrorists in the criminal
justice system would "inappropriately tie the United States' hands."'"
As Cole suggests, 7 if charge or release were the only choices and officials
could not opt for detention, the high burden of proof in criminal cases would
allow an Al Qaeda fighter to game the system and return to the fight. A
soldier for one of the Axis powers during World War II was entitled to release
only at the war's conclusion or the advent of peace. However, an individual
whom the government could show by clear and convincing evidence was an
Al Qaeda fighter would be entitled to release, since the government could
not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had committed a crime. This
asymmetry in results would give terrorists an incentive to recruit, while limiting
counterterrorism strategies.
Empirical investigation supports Cole's claim that wholesale release
of detainees would pose security risks. Independent studies published in
2oo8 revealed that a significant number of detainees boasted of their prior
involvement with the Taliban and Al Qaeda.'" Court decisions since then have
buttressed this point with specific facts about detainees' ties.'9
16. Id. at 727. For discussion of relevant legal standards, see Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F Supp.2d
63, 74-77 (D.D.C. 2009); f Ryan Goodman, The Detention of Civilians in Armed Conflict,
103 Am. J. Int'l L. 48, 70 71 (2oog) (suggesting that in certain contexts detention of civilians
linked with violent groups such as Al Qaeda and the Taliban complies with law of war, while
specifying that compliance hinges on humane treatment).
17. See Cole, supra note 14, at 731-32.
18. See Benjamin Wittes, Law and the Long War: The Future of Justice in the Age of Terror
84-92 (Penguin 2oog) (noting that many detainees acknowledged working on behalf of
Al Qaeda and the Taliban, including Walid Bin 'Attash, who told an administrative
tribunal that he had "purchas[ed] explosives" for the 1998 Kenyan and Tanzanian embassy
bombings and the attack on the U.S.S. Cole); see also William Glaberson & Margot Williams,
Next President Will Face Test on Detainees, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 2oo8, at As (providing
comprehensive survey of detainees).
19. See Fahad v. U.S., 611 E3 d 8 (D.C. Cir. June 30, 20o) (denying habeas petition, citing evidence
that detainee had trained at a Taliban camp, obtained an AK-4 7 rifle, and participated in
an extended march with armed men); Al-Adahi, et al. v. Obama, 698 ESupp.2d 48 (D.D.C.
Mar. so, 2oso) (denying petition of Fami Salem Al-Assani, who trained at Al Qaeda's main
Afghanistan camp and accompanied Osama bin Laden at Tora Bora in December, 2005).
For a balanced account of habeas litigation that criticizes the government for digging in
its heels on some cases but also argues that decisions in higher courts will vindicate the
government's positions in many detainee matters, see Benjamin Wittes, Why I Don't Like
the "Scorecard," Lawfare: Hard Nat'l Security Choices, Sept. 2010, available at http://www.
lawfareblog.com/2oo/o 9 /why-i-dont-like-the-scorecard/. While the present administration
has approached detention cases more reasonably than Justice Department officials from the
prior administration, questions linger over the moratorium on release of Yemeni detainees
whom the government's own task force has cleared for release. See Charlie Savage, Ruling
Raises Doubts on Policy on Transfer Of Yemenis, N.Y. Times, July 9, 2soo, at Ass.
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Dismissing this convergence as backsliding or opacity does not do Cole
justice. He has shown continued vigor in advocating for those wrongfully
detained.20 However, Cole has also recognized that detention in particular
cases, accompanied byjudicial review, may be the only way to plug "unprotected
spot[s] in the Nation's armor."21
This convergence is far from complete. Substantial disagreement exists
on whether courts should develop detention standards through habeas
proceedings" or whether a statute is necessary to guide courts' discretion.13
2o. See David Cole, What to Do About Guantinamo?, N.Y. Rev. Books, May 28, 2oo, available
at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2oio/oct/i4/what-do-about-Guantinamo/.
Cole has also served as counsel for Maher Arar, who sought damages for his alleged
extraordinary rendition to Syria, see Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F 3d 559, 580 (2d Cir. 2oo9) (en
banc), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 3409 (200) (holding that national security and foreign affairs
concerns required precluding damages action), and for the Humanitarian Law Project,
which argued in the Supreme Court that a federal statute violated its First Amendment
rights. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2726 (200) (upholding
statute that bars providing material support such as funding or training to foreign terrorist
organizations) [hereinafter HLP v. Holder]; see also infra, notes 39-48 and accompanying
text (discussing material support laws). The author served as co-counsel on an amicus brief
supporting the constitutionality of the statute challenged in HLP v. Holder, contingent
on interpreting the statute to respect First Amendment rights. See Brief for Amicus Curiae
Scholars, Attorneys, and Former Public Officials with Experience in Terrorism-Related
Issues, available at http://ccrjustice.org/holder-v-humanitarian-law-project (arguing that
court should read statute as including exceptions for lawyers providing advice on compliance
with federal law, journalists, scholars, and human rights groups).
21. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (citation omitted).
22. See Human Rights First & The Constitution Project, Habeas Works: Federal Courts'
Proven Capacity To Handle Guantinamo Cases (June 2oo), available at http://www.
humanrightsfirst.org/pdf/Habeas-Works-final-web.pdf (arguing that courts are competent
to develop workable standards); cf Steve Vladeck, The Case Against the Graham Bill,
Prawfsblawg, Sept. 2010, available at http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/20o/o9/
the-case-against-the-graham-bill.html (arguing that statute would lead to undue rigidity
and unfairness, and also encourage new detentions, including detention of United States
persons on American soil).
23. See Benjamin Wittes, Robert Chesney & Rabea Benhalim, The Emerging Law of Detention:
The Guantinamo Cases as Lawmaking, Governance Studies at Brookings, Jan. 22, 2oo,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=15 4o6oi (criticizing lack of uniformity in district court
habeas decisions); Robert Chesney & Benjamin Wittes, Resolving Ambiguities? Yes.
Dramatically Expanding Existing Detention Authority? No., Lawfare: Hard Nat'l Security
Choices, Sept. 20o, available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/2oro/o9/resolving-ambiguities-
yes-dramatically-expanding-existing-detention-authority-no/#more-4o6 (defending bill
introduced by Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) to codify habeas determinations); Walter E.
Kuhn, The Terrorist Detention Review Reform Act: Detention Policy and Political Reality,
Seton Hall Leg. J. (forthcoming 2oo), draft available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1683636;
f Matthew C. Waxman, Guantinamo, Habeas Corpus, and Standards of Proof: Viewing
the Law Through Multiple Lenses, 42 Case W. Res.J. Int'l L. 245, 258-63 (2009) (analyzing
possible standards).
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Scholars also disagree on the appropriate scope of the detention power.24
However, these differences play out against a backdrop of consensus that some
form of detention is both necessary and legitimate, as long as judicial review is
available to uphold due process and sort out false positives.'5
B. Convergence, Constraint, and Rights
The emerging consensus on detention, which may seem at first blush like
a nod to the right, partners with a consensus that originated with the left-the
need for constraints. Scholars with a progressive bent have pointed out that
constraints on the executive's detention authority have a first-order purpose:
They limit the ability of the executive branch to manipulate factors like
geography, which officials in the Bush Administration invested with talismanic
significance when they established Guantinamo. 6 However, constraints
have a second-order purpose as well that often appeals to conservatives with
a prudential bent. By signaling that government power is not unbounded,
constraints encourage a wise executive to ration the ways in which she elects
to push the envelope. Constrained in this manner, the executive's pick of
occasions for the exercise of power is more likely to trigger deference from
other stakeholders, including the courts. In this vein, Jack Goldsmith has
argued that the Bush Administration failed to obtain lasting approval for
its policies because it viewed consultation as inconvenient or unnecessary.27
For both liberals and nuanced conservatives, constraints are both necessary
and desirable because they temper the pursuit of short-term goals with
consideration of long-term values and interests.
24. Compare Cole, supra note 1a (arguing for limited scope focusing on Al Qaeda higher-ups and
active fighters), with Wittes, Chesney & Benhalim, supra note 23 (arguing for wider scope of
detention authority).
25. Some commentators have also urged creation of a national security court. Compare Glenn
Sulmasy, The National Security Court System: A Natural Evolution of Justice in an Age
of Terror (Oxford Univ. Press 2009) (recommending creation of national security court);
Kevin E. Lunday & Harvey Rishikof, Due Process is a Strategic Choice: Legitimacy and
the Establishment of an Article III National Security Court, 39 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 87 (2008)
(same); with Human Rights First & The Constitution Project, Habeas Works, supra note
22 (arguing that federal courts' strong performance with habeas cases obviates need for
other forums); Richard B. Zabel &JamesJ. Benjamin, Jr., In Pursuit ofJustice: Prosecuting
Terrorism Cases in the Federal Courts (Human Rights First 2008), available at http://www.
humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/08052i-USLS-pursuit-justice.pdf (concluding that federal courts
can try suspected terrorists efficiently); Hearing of the Terrorism and Homeland Security
Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Prosecuting Terrorists: Civilian and
Military Trials for Guantinamo and Beyond, Fed. News Service, July 28, 2009 (hereinafter
Subcommittee Hearing) (remarks of Sen. Whitehouse, D-R.I.) (same).
26. See Azmy, supra note 12, at 467 (warning against executive manipulation of bright-line rules);
see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008) (protecting access to habeas corpus so
that political branches could not "switch the Constitution on and off at will").
27. Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law andJudgment Inside the Bush Administration
206-07 (WW. Norton & Co. 2007).
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C. Convergence and International Law
One constraint that has attracted a nascent if still provisional consensus
is the role of international law. Pitched intellectual battles occurred on this
ground in the early years of the Bush Administration. However, the couple of
years have seen softening in positions on the left and right.
Before the Obama Administration, debates on international law usually
entailed two polar opposite stances. One perspective, associated with Bush
Administration officials, viewed particular sources of international law,
such as customary international law, as being an illegitimate and incoherent
source of rules. Jack Goldsmith and his co-author, Eric Posner, developed
this view in a series of articles, and refined it for a 2oo5 book. 2 Goldsmith
also wrote disparagingly about the "human rights industry."29 In contrast,
pro-international law scholars extolled customary international law and
international law. When a succession of bipartisan American administrations
declined to give international law the precise effect it had elsewhere, seeking to
adapt it to American contexts, critics often denounced this effort as American
"exceptionalism"-a failure to live by rules that the rest of the world accepts. 30
In the Obama era, however, convergence has smoothed these jagged
edges. Goldsmith still has severe doubts about CIL, but seems more open
to the position that nations develop customary norms to further long-term
interests in predictability and cooperation, even when those norms impair
short-term interests.3' If this is true, customary international norms may serve
a purpose akin to domestic constitutional constraints, curbing what Hamilton
described as the impulsive "humors" of the people and their representatives.32
By the same token, Harold Koh, who now serves as the legal adviser to the
28. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford Univ.
Press 2006); but see David M. Golove, Leaving Customary International Law Where It Is:
Goldsmith and Posner's The Limits of International Law, 34 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 333,
364-70 (2oo6) (criticizing Goldsmith and Posner's views as reductive).
29. See Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency, supra note 27, at 59. Goldsmith's view on this point
clashed with his view in the same book, that constraints can be healthy, disciplining the
executive to pick her shots. Id. at 206-07. For analysis of Goldsmith's complex views, see Peter
Margulies, True Believers at Law: National Security Agendas, The Regulation of Lawyers,
and the Separation of Powers, 68 Md. L. Rev. i (2oo8); cf Stephen Holmes, The Spider's
Web: How Government Lawbreakers Routinely Elude the Law, in When Governments
Break the Law: The Rule of Law and the Prosecution of the Bush Administration in2, 133
35 (Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain eds., NYU Press 200) (citing Goldsmith's skepticism
about human rights advocacy, but not acknowledging countervailing praise of constraints
in Goldsmith's book).
30. Cf Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1479, 1480-95 (2003)
(discussing positive and negative elements of American exceptionalism).
31. See Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional
Law, Public Law, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1791, i826-28, 1835 (2009) (discussing institutionalist
version of international and constitutional law as coordinated games in which parties accept
fewer short-term benefits to realize gains over time).
32. See The Federalist no.78 (Alexander Hamilton), at 470 (Clinton Rossiter ed., New American
Library 1961).
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State Department, has articulated a more flexible view of international law,
acknowledging that events such as 9/11 can lead to changes in norms such
as the criteria for national self-defense. For example, they can justify actions
such as drone attacks in Pakistan against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, as long as
those strikes comport with basic guarantees such as avoiding disproportionate
harm to civilians.33 One rationale for the drone strikes may be the difficulty
of new detentions since law has come to Guantinamo. In sum, for abstract
and instrumental reasons, subtle convergence may be carrying the day on the
international law front.34
II. An Unwelcome Convergence: Dominant Doctrinalism
While the substantive convergence described above has been a welcome
trend, the same cannot be said about the triumph of what I call dominant
doctrinalism. Legal scholarship and pedagogy after September ii focused on
the doctrinal implications of the Bush Administration's unilateral acts, rather
than on other measures which affected just as many if not more individuals.
Doctrinalism-a focus on legal doctrine to the exclusion of other factors such
as social, economic, and political factors-has been a bane of law since the
hey-day of formalism.35 To show its influence in the post-9/n climate, I first
33. See Harold Hongju Koh, U.S. Dept. of State, The Obama Administration and International
Law, Annual Meeting of the Am. Soc'y of Int'l L., March 25, 2oo, available at http://www.
state.gov/sA/releases/remarks/139i 9 .htm.
34. Debate has also narrowed on the question of accountability for Bush Administration policies,
including coercive interrogation. The Justice Department decided not to seek professional
discipline of lawyers who drafted opinions authorizing such tactics. See David Margolis,
Assoc. Deputy Attorney General, Memorandum of Decision Regarding the Objections
to the Findings of Professional Misconduct in the Office of Professional Responsibility's
Report of Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues
Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency's Use of "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques"
on Suspected Terrorists, Jan. 5, 2oio, available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/
DAGMargolisMemoiooio 5 .pdf. Some scholars disagree with the Justice Department's
justification for declining to seek sanctions. See David Cole, They Did Authorize
Torture, But..., N.Y. Rev. Bks, Mar. so, 2009, available at http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/
nyrblog/2oo/mar/io/they-did-authorize-torture-but/ (arguing that DOJ Final Report did
not adequately address flaws in lawyers' opinions); David Luban, David Margolis is Wrong:
The Justice Department's ethics investigation shouldn't leave John Yoo and Jay Bybee
home free, Slate, Feb. 22, Qoso, availableat http://www.slate.com/id/224553h/ (same). Others
viewed the decision as appropriate, while agreeing that the lawyers' advice was myopic, at
best. See Peter Margulies, Changing of the Guard: The Obama Administration, National
Security, and the Ethics of Legal Transitions (unpublished manuscript), draft available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=16 73989. However, few if any members of the legal academy
argued for resumption of these coercive measures.
35. Decades ago, the legal realists discussed the normative and descriptive challenges with a
formalist approach to legal doctrine. See Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate
Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 Vand.
L. Rev. 395 (1950) (arguing that equally respected canons of statutory interpretation often
led to opposite results). For an argument that some supposedly formalist judges actually
considered policy, see Brian Z. Tamanaha, Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide: The Role
of Politics in Judging 67-90 (Princeton Univ. Press 2009).
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consider the post-9/ii neglect of criminal laws governing terrorism. I then
briefly examine the quality of attention paid to issuance of National Security
Letters (NSLs), compared to the scholarly attention devoted to the Bush
Administration's Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP).
A. Pedagogy Neglected: The Strange Case of the Material Support Statutes
The legal academy has largely failed to address the scope and operation
of criminal statutes regarding terrorism, including a matched pair of federal
statutes that bar "material support" of terrorist activity36 and designated
foreign terrorist organizations.37 The government has prosecuted scores of
defendants-the vast majority of them Muslim and/or Arab-under these
statutes, while seeking to detain only three United States persons.38 However,
this development has received only modest scholarly attention.
The government has used § 23 39 B, which prohibits material support
specifically intended to facilitate terrorist activity, in many of these cases.
Prosecutions often rely on informants who act as entrepreneurs serving a
personal agenda. In exchange for substantial cash rewards or consideration
regarding their own legal difficulties, informants promise prosecutors that they
will deliver a package of defendants.39 In a number of cases, informants have
had to coax and cajole their targets, who seemed distracted by ordinary matters
like exercise and jobs.4o Some of these cases had to be brought despite doubts
36. See 18 U.S.C. § 23 39 A (20o0).
37. See 18 U.S.C. § 23 39 B (Qoio).
38. This group includes Ali Saleh al-Marri, a foreign national arrested in the United States,
with whom the Obama Administration's Justice Department, under Attorney General
Eric Holder, concluded a plea agreement in 2009. See John Schwartz, Path to Justice,
but Bumpy, for Terrorists, N.Y. Times, May 2, 2009, at Ag. It also includes United States
citizen Jose Padilla, who was arrested in Chicago, and eventually convicted of violating 18
U.S.C. § 233 9 B after being held as an enemy combatant for over three-and-a-half years.
See Margulies, Law's Detour, supra note 2, at 112-13. The third detainee was Yaser Esam
Hamdi, a presumptive United States citizen who had lived most of his life abroad. Hamdi
was captured in Afghanistan, and released in 2004 after the Supreme Court held that that
the government needed to comply with due process for his continued detention. See Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2oo4); Joel Brinkley & Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Releases Saudi-
American It Had Captured in Afghanistan, NY Times, Oct. 11, 2004, at As5-
39. Cf U.S. v. Hayat, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 40157 (E.D. Ca. May 17, 2007) (denying motion for
a new trial; quoting juror who was convinced after long deliberations that defendant had
provided material support to terrorism and lied to federal agents, but who acknowledged that
"future cases" brought under the counterterrorism statutes could result in sending people
to prison "who never committed the crime"). The case involved an informant who made
persistent approaches to Hayat to travel to Afghanistan, and a confession obtained after
fifteen hours of interrogation. See Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory
Prosecution and the Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 8o S. Cal. L. Rev. 425, 488-89
(2007).
40. See Margulies, Law's Detour, supra note 2, at io6 (discussing the case of Bronx bassist Tarik
Shah, who eventually pleaded guilty to a violation of § 23 39 B); see also id. at 117 (discussing
Miami "Seas of David" case, in which an informant working with the government and
promising free merchandise persuaded a religious sect of Haitian Americans to turn away
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about their provenance, particularly where targets had special knowledge of
a particular area, as in the JFK bombing plot, or had previously engaged in
illegal conduct, such as the Fort Dix conspiracy defendants.4' However, in
other cases, the time-honored fuzziness of conspiracy law allowed prosecutors
to charge defendants catalyzed by an informant with crimes based on proof of
an agreement to engage in illegal activity, and little more.
While there is a rich literature on prosecutorial decisionmaking42 and on
informants,43 few writers have focused on the decisions made by prosecutors
in terrorism cases.44 Most other scholarship, and, I fear, teaching has been
sketchy. Few articles discuss in depth the interaction of detention of alleged
terrorists and criminal liability.45 The disjuncture stems in part from the
awkward fit between this aspect of criminal law and established doctrinal fields
from internecine squabbling just long enough to collect data on South Florida and Chicago
landmarks, including the Sears Tower). I do not suggest that prosecutors should stop using
such statutes, which often provide the only way to ferret out certain types of dangerous
conduct. However, scholars should engage further with the difficult trade-offs such cases
present. For example, in a recent case involving a conspiracy to place bombs at Bronx
synagogues, a government informant strongly suggested that the defendants would receive
substantial amounts of cash if they followed through on the plot, and that the informant's
life would be in danger if the defendants refused. See Kareem Fahim, Informer in Synagogue
Plot Is Accused of Bullying Suspect, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 2010, at A2o. While the judge
expressed doubts about portions of the informant's testimony incriminating the defendants,
the defendants did not dispute that they were arrested after planting devices outside the
temples which they believed to be explosives (the devices, supplied by the informant, were
actually fake). Id. The defendants' entrapment defense ultimately failed to persuade the jury.
See Kareem Fahim, 4 Convicted of Attempting to Blow Up 2 Synagogues, N.Y. Times, Oct.
19, 2oo, at A2s.
41. See Margulies, Law's Detour, supra note 2, at 122.
42. See, e.g., Fred Z. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions: A
Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. Rev. i (soso) (discussing
content and implementation of rules to encourage prosecutors to prevent wrongful
convictions).
43. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling
and Embellishment, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 917 (999) (noting incentives for dishonesty among
cooperators); but see Michael A. Simons, Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and
Atonement, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 33-42 (2003) (arguing that cooperation can spur atonement,
instead of merely reflecting utilitarian calculus); £f Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients,
56 Ohio St. L.J. 69 (1995) (discussing cooperation and legal ethics).
44. For an insightful exception that discusses the discretion the statute gives to prosecutors, see
Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy, supra note 39. Ironically, since Chesney supports statutory
codification of habeas standards, see Wittes, Chesney & Benhalim, supra note 23, Margulies
and Metcalf would view him as a conservative. This litmus test illustrates doctrinalism's
creeping influence, even among those who purport to reject it.
45. In addition to Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy, supra note 39, see Norman Abrams, Anti-
Terrorism and Criminal Enforcement (2d ed., West 2005); Stephen Dycus, et al., National
Security Law 817-38 (4 th ed., Aspen Pub. 2007); Benjamin J. Priester, Who is a "Terrorist"?
Drawing the Line Between Criminal Defendants and Military Enemies, 2008 Utah L. Rev.
1255 (2008); Tung Yin, Coercion and Terrorism Prosecutions in the Shadow of Military
Detention, 2006 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1255-
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within legal education. Criminal counterterrorism statutes are important to
national security law, but less central than issues of separation of powers, the
use of force, and detention.46 They have less salience in constitutional law than
executive power, federalism, due process, and equal protection.47 Similarly,
they are less foundational to criminal law than bedrock issues of criminal
responsibility.48 This is not a knock on casebook authors, who face difficult
choices on what to cover. Nevertheless, legal education's focus on doctrine
shapes those choices in particular ways, which do not always match law's real-
world consequences. 49
B. Disproportionate Doctrinalism and the Case ofthe Missing National Securiy Letters
Another measure ofdisproportionate doctrinalism has been the vast attention
paid to the Bush Administration's program of warrantless surveillance,50 as
46. Even in a national security law casebook, other topics receive substantially more attention.
See Dycus, et al., supra note 45, at 703-58 (detention); 876-906 (military commissions).
47. See Paul Brest, et. al., Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Cases and Materials 841-
81 (5 th ed., Aspen Pub. 2006) (discussing executive power and detention). Issues relating to
the material support statutes receive little coverage in this otherwise excellent casebook.
48. See Sanford Kadish, StephenJ. Schulhofer & Carol Steiker, Criminal Law and Its Processes:
Cases and Materials 602-03 (8th ed., Aspen Pub. 2007) (discussing material support
statutes).
49. The issue of interrogation techniques has filtered through the law school curriculum. A
casebook on professional responsibility has included useful materials regarding legal advice
authorizing coercive interrogation of terror suspects. See Lisa G. Lerman & Philip G. Schrag,
Ethical Problems in the Practice of Law 302-04 (2d ed., Aspen Pub. 2008) (discussing
problem developed by Professor Kathleen Clark of Washington University); cf Kadish,
Schulhofer & Steiker, supra note 48, at 814-21 (discussing defense of necessity in cases
involving coercive questioning). Legal ethics scholars have analyzed these issues in depth.
See David Luban, The Torture Lawyers of Washington, in Legal Ethics and Human Dignity,
Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Law 162, 176-80, 200-02 (Cambridge Univ. Press
2007); Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum, 1J. Nat'l
Sec. L. & Pol'y 455 (2005); Stephen Gillers, Legal Ethics: A Debate, in The Torture Debate
in America 236, 237-38 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2005); Margulies,
True Believers at Law, supra note 29; W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of
Law and Morals, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 67, 8o-85 (2005); cf Norman W. Spaulding, Professional
Independence in the Office of the Attorney General, 6o Stan. L. Rev. 1931, 1975-76 (2008)
(arguing that flaws in legal advice emerged from ideology, not from kowtowing to client's
wishes). Casebooks in constitutional law may devote more space to §2 33 9 B after the
Supreme Court's decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010),
holding that Congress could impose what the majority termed content-based restrictions
on speech, such as training in non-violence, performed under the direction and control
of a foreign terrorist organization such as Hamas. However, this increased attention only
confirms the sway of dominant doctrinalism, since the plaintiffs in this case mounted an
as-applied challenge based on their alleged fear that prosecutors would target them if they
engaged in this activity. No actual prosecution had ever taken place.
50. See Margulies, Law's Detour, supra note 2, at 17-19; Eric Lichtblau, Bush's Law: The
Remaking of American Justice 154-55 (Pantheon Books 2oo8); Charlie Savage, Takeover:
The Return of the Imperial Presidency and the Subversion of American Democracy 115-18
(Little, Brown and Co. 2007)-
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compared with the use of National Security Letters (NSLs) and other forms of
statutorily authorized administrative requests for information.5' The Terrorist
Surveillance Program (TSP) was more significant doctrinally, because the
Bush Administration acted without statutory authorization.52 However, there
is a strong argument that NSLs led to the retention of more private data by
federal authorities.53 The use of NSLs also led to bad habits in law enforcement
which will be difficult to break. For example, officials sometimes used
"blanket" NSLs that covered a wide spectrum of information requests not tied
to a specific investigation.54 The Justice Department's own inspector general
rightly condemned this practice.55 In addition, the FBI failed to document
its use of NSLs both internally and in reports to Congress.56 Moreover, until
recently, the law required a recipient of an NSL to keep the contents of the
letter confidential, even from the recipient's lawyer.57 Recently, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, after holding the statute unconstitutional because
it placed the burden on the recipient of the letter to contest the confidentiality
provisions, fashioned a novel remedy that facilitated such challenges?5
However, few commentators have addressed the use of NSLs, despite their
intrusiveness, perhaps because Congress provided for them, and discovering
abuses requires a more careful look at law "on the ground," not just legal
doctrine.59
51. See 18 U.S.C. § 270 9 (b)(i), (2) (200). In the USA PATRIOT Act, Congress broadened
the statutory authorization for National Security Letters (NSLs) to allow the FBI to
seek information "relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities." Id. Prior to September ii, the statute had
required "specific and articulable facts giving reasons to believe that the person or entity to
whom the information sought pertains is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power."
See United States Dep't of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, A Review of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation's Use of National Security Letters, March 2007, at 23 (hereinafter
OIG NSL Report), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/so 7o3b/final.pdf.
52. The TSP evaded the constraints Congress had enacted as part of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA). See 50 U.S.C. § 1801-45 (2oo). See Edward T Swaine, The Political
Economy of Youngstown, 83 S. Cal. L. Rev. 263, 316-24 (2010).
53. See Margulies, Law's Detour, supra note 2, at 2o.
54. Id. at 21.
55. See OIG NSL Report, supra note 51, at 72-90.
56. See Margulies, Law's Detour, supra note 2, at 170 n.87.
57. See Samuel J. Rascoff, Domesticating Intelligence, 83 S. Cal. L. Rev. 575, 643-44 (010).
58. See Doe v. Mukasey, 549 E3d 861 (2d Cir. 2oo8).
59. For selected exceptions, see Dycus, et al., supra note 45, at 557-81; see also Orin Kerr,
Updating the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 225, 232 (2008)
(mentioning Congress' enactment of authority for NSLs); Paul M. Schwartz, Reviving
Telecommunications Surveillance Law, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 287, 301-02 (2008) (comparing
NSLs with FISA regime).
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III. Challenging Doctrinalism's Empire
Legal educators should strive to break doctrinalism's grip. The task will not
be easy, because so much of legal education still turns on coverage of doctrinal
issues. Indeed, discarding doctrine would be as ill-advised as it is unavailing.
The task is to supplement and inform doctrinal teaching on law and terrorism,
which I suggest with three steps: i) enhance clinical education opportunities
for representing the despised and unpopular, 2) promote understanding of
social phenomena, such as path-dependence, that affect lawyering, and, 3)
teach how the structure of legal institutions affects outcomes.
A. Clinical Education and the Virtues of Vigorous Advocacyfor Pariahs
To combat doctrinalism, law schools should enhance experiential learning
on the interaction of law and terrorism. Clinics, simulations, and skills
courses that focus on issues of law and terrorism can deepen the learning that
doctrinalism often obscures. Students in clinics that represented detainees
learned about the challenges of lawyering for the unpopular and despised, the
affective as well as instrumental needs of clients,6 o and the eclectic advocacy
strategies necessary for competently representing this group.' Clinics also
taught students the power of rights, although as Margulies and Metcalf
note, that power is always provisional and frequently fleeting. At their best,
clinics taught students to be resourceful, reaching out to new forums and
audiences, and to tolerate and embrace the ambiguity of legal representation
in cross-cultural settings.2 In some cases, as I'll discuss in the next subsection,
clinicians and other lawyers became over-invested in their own narratives,
and failed to anticipate that narratives that worked in one context, such as
Guantinamo's first generation, would be less useful down the road. However,
because of their focus on the concrete dynamics of cases, clinics are an ideal
site for brainstorming about these dilemmas of legal practice.
6o. See Robert Dinerstein, Stephen Ellman, Isabelle Gunning & Ann Shalleck, Connection,
Capacity and Morality in Lawyer-Client Relationships: Dialogues and Commentary, to
Clinical L. Rev. 755, 758-66 (oo4).
61. See Muneer I. Ahmad, Resisting Guantinamo: Rights at the Brink of Dehumanization,
103 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1683 (2009); Mark Denbeaux & Christina Boyd-Nafstad, The Attorney-
Client Relationship in Guantinamo Bay, 3o Fordham Int'l L.J. 491 (00 7); Jonathan Hafetz,
Habeas Corpus, Judicial Review, and Limits on Secrecy in Detentions at Guantinamo, 5
Cardozo Pub. L. Pol'y & Ethics J. 127 (2006); Martha Rayner, Roadblocks to Effective
Representation of Uncharged, Indefinitely Imprisoned Clients at Guantinamo Bay Military
Base, 3o Fordham Int'l L.J. 485 (2007); ef Scott L. Cummings, The Internationalization of
Public Interest Law, 57 Duke L.J. 891 (2008) (discussing innovations in practice by public
interest lawyers across the globe).
62. See Muneer I. Ahmad, Interpreting Communities: Lawyering Across Language Difference,
54 UCLA L. Rev. 999 (2007) (discussing lawyering issues arising because of differences of
language and culture with clients); Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural
Competence in Lawyers, 8 Clinical L. Rev. 33,33 (200).
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Clinics tell students that rights matter. As critical feminist and race theorists
have observed,3 rights can be a part of a discourse that empowers. They are
not a panacea, as critics of the legal profession's performance over the past
nine years have noted. 64 However, just as legal advocacy during the civil rights
movement chipped out a foothold for further mobilization efforts, rights since
9/11 raise consciousness and redefine the contours of what is possible. 65 For
example, when lawyers began seeing scores of Guantinamo detainees in 2004,
after the Supreme Court's decision in Rasul v. Bush, independent accounts
reflect that the treatment of the detainees improved. This improvement did
not resolve all problems, by any means; non-dangerous detainees still lacked
a clear pathway to release, and confinement was still rigorous. However, the
government stopped using the harshest interrogation techniques. 66 The causes
were complex, including pushback from more scrupulous lawyers within the
administration, 67 but the presence of lawyers at Guantinamo was clearly one
factor. The government knew that detainee lawyers would report ongoing
abuses, and it took steps to give the lawyers less to talk about.
63. See Patricia J. Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights: Diary of a Law Professor
(Harvard Univ. Press 1992); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics:
Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 589 (1986); cf Richard
Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?,
22 Harv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rev. 301 (1987) (analyzing flaws and benefits of critical legal studies
agenda which discounted value of rights).
64. See Margulies & Metcalf, supra note 8; compare Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in
the "War on Terror," io8 Colum. L. Rev. 1013 (2oo8) (asserting that emphasis on procedural
rights of detainees has frequently neglected substantive questions), with Neal Kumar Katyal,
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to Practice, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 65 (2006)
(arguing for virtues of advocacy approach that cast government as challenging established
procedures).
65. For an insightful account that avoids reifying rights but nonetheless recognizes their power
in certain situations, see Ahmad, Resisting Guantinamo, supra note 61, at 1712-13.
66. See Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Executive Summary, Inquiry
into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody, noth Cong., 2d Sess., Nov. 2008, at xxv.
Reporters have documented the use ofwaterboarding in 2003. See Scott Shane, Interrogations'
Effectiveness May Prove Elusive, N.Y. Times, April 23, 2009, at A14 (discussing March, 2003
waterboarding of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the alleged mastermind of the 9/11 attacks,
documented in Justice Department memoranda). However, reporters have been unable to
document use of waterboarding in 2004 or subsequent years, after officials from the Justice
Department and the CIA Inspector General's office began to raise questions. Id.
67. See Goldsmith, Terror Presidency, supra note 27, at 142-54 (discussing successful effort to
withdraw two legal opinions that provided legal support for "enhanced" interrogation
techniques); Jane Mayer, The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror
Turned Into a War on American Ideals 316-18 (Doubleday 2008) (describing efforts during
President Bush's second term of officials serving under Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
such as Legal AdviserJohn Bellinger, Matthew Waxman, and Philip Zelikow); Testimony of
Philip Zelikow, Hearing of the Administrative Oversight and the Courts Subcommittee of
the Senate Judiciary Committee Chaired by Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI), Fed. News
Service, May 13, 2009 (same).
387
Journal ofLegal Education
Similarly, rights move the baselines of possible outcomes. Before Rasul and
Boumediene, the big question for detainees who did not pose a danger was if
they would be released. After these cases, the question for detainees held not
to be part of Al Qaeda68 was when release would come. There is a big difference
between these two questions. The latter makes it far easier to obtain leverage
against the government. Moreover, lawyers have "voted with their feet" on
these issues-lawyers seek to bring habeas petitions for detainees at other sites,
such as Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan,9 precisely because those lawyers
know that rights do bring increased leverage for their clients. The government
seems to believe this too-that is why the Bush Administration fought tooth
and nail against rights for detainees, and why the Obama Administration is
now contesting the habeas rights of detainees at Bagram. Indeed, although
Joe Margulies now criticizes a focus on rights in his co-authored article for
this symposium, a few years ago he confessed that "few moments in [his] legal
career have been as gratifying" as the reunion he witnessed between a just-
released Guantinamo client and the client's wife.7o
As this moving moment reveals, clinics can also teach lawyers that
competent representation includes what I've called "affective solidarity."7'
Lawyers do not merely promote the legal interests of their clients; they also
help provide the emotional support that clients in difficult situations need.
Clients who are isolated and despised like the Guantinamo detainees need
this human support more than most.7 Sometimes this support shows itself
through simple human acts that a lawyer is uniquely situated to perform
for the client in detention: For example, lawyers representing Guantinamo
detainees in habeas or military commission proceedings were permitted to
bring their clients food. Baher Azmy, a Seton Hall law professor and attorney
for a wrongly accused client, Murat Kurnaz, recounted that he bonded with
his client after bringing him McDonald's coffee with six packets of sugar,
which Azmy later supplemented with "baklava, cheese, pita bread, Turkish
68. Courts applying the law of war have held that being part of Al Qaeda entails giving or
receiving "orders or directions" within the group. See Barhoumi v. Obama, 6o9 F3 d 416, 424
(D.C. Cir. 2oio).
69. See Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3 d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2oo) (holding that habeas jurisdiction did not
extend to Bagram).
70. See Joseph Margulies, Guantinamo and the Abuse of Presidential Power 2 (Simon &
Schuster 2006).
71. See Peter Margulies, The Virtues and Vices of Solidarity: Regulating the Roles of Lawyers
for Clients Accused of Terrorist Activity, 62 Md. L. Rev. 173, 179-81 (2003).
72. With a client such as Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, attending to this human element is
more challenging. See William H. Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal
Formalism, 32 Stan. L. Rev. 487 (1980) (discussing limits on teaching of empathy as
virtue in legal representation). Yet, we praise lawyers who can marshal empathy, even-or
perhaps especially-when their clients' conduct seemingly makes this impossible. SeeJessica
Silbey, Truth Tales and Trial Films, 40 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 551, 578 n.102 (2007) (discussing
film account of Clarence Darrow's plea for the lives of his clients, the convicted murderers
Leopold and Loeb).
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figs, fresh garlic.. .subs, pizza, Filet-O-Fish," and a veritable smorgasbord of
other culinary items.3 Sharing food with a detainee client was an affirmation
of the precious rhythms of life's routine, which a facility like Guantinamo
disrupted.74 This form of affective solidarity had an instrumental component
as well; it helped build rapport and facilitate discussion of facts relevant to the
representation .7
In helping students explore the intangible realm of affective interactions,
clinical courses add a dimension that doctrine neglects. Doctrinal courses will
help a lawyer understand legal arguments, but getting to the legal arguments
is impossible unless the client is willing to actually speak with the lawyer.
A client who lacks trust in the lawyer will not pursue a legal challenge, and
therefore cannot keep the government honest in the way that the Constitution
envisions. Clinical courses bring home this reality, and give the lawyer a
repertoire of techniques for gaining client trust.
Clinicians know that rights also galvanize mobilization in other spheres,
which I have called crossover advocacy.76 For example, when Maher Arar
filed a lawsuit challenging his extraordinary rendition to Syria, where he was
tortured for the better part of a year, he was also able to obtain a congressional
hearing looking into his case. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, not one
given to casual displays of regret, acknowledged that the government had
handled Arar's case poorly.77 This reckoning, however partial, documented
the practice of extraordinary renditions,5 and helped persuade the Obama
Administration to stop the practice.
By instilling this affective component and commitment to crossover
advocacy, clinical education nurtures lawyers who can challenge future patterns
of government overreaching. Consider a law student like Sarah H. Lorr, who
73. SeeJonathan Hafetz & Mark P. Denbeaux, The Guantinamo Lawyers 58 (NYU Press 2009).
74. See Ahmad, Resisting Guantinamo, supra note 
61.
75. Guantinamo Lawyers, supra note 73, at 63-64 (recollection of habeas lawyer Joshua
Colangelo-Bryan).
76. See Peter Margulies, The Detainees' Dilemma: The Virtues and Vices of Advocacy Strategies
in the War on Terror, 57 Buff. L. Rev. 347, 423-29 (2009); The Guantinamo Lawyers,
supra note 73, at 308-09 (discussing advocacy efforts at Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights by American University law professor Rick Wilson); c Anthony V. Alfieri,
Post-Racialism in the Inner City: Structure and Culture in Lawyering, 98 Geo. L.J. 921,
957-66 (2oo) (discussing use of rights as element in community organizing, education,
and advocacy); Sameer M. Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance Movements, 95
Calif. L. Rev. 1879, 1905-06 (007) (discussing role of lawyers in organizing subordinated
communities).
77. See Scott Shane, On Torture, 2 Messages and a High Political Cost, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30,
2007, at A,8.
78. See Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the
Rule of Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1333 (2007); cf Peter Margulies, Judging Myopia in
Hindsight: Bivens Actions, National Security Decisions, and the Rule of Law, Iowa L.
Rev. (forthcoming 2010) [hereinafter Judging Myopia], draft available at http://ssm.com/
abstract1 5 644I (analyzing actions for damages involving extraordinary renditions).
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visited Guantinamo while in Fordham's International Justice Clinic. Lorr,
who had to cross to the other side of a barbed-wire fence to interview a client
spending his fifth year in confinement without judicial review, will likely view
the government's future claims with a robust skepticism born of experience.79
Like the perspectives that veteran death penalty lawyers such as Joe Margulies
and Clive Stafford-Smith brought to their Guantinamo representation,
clinical experience prods lawyers to question authority even in extraordinary
times, when conventional wisdom initially counsels deference.so
Although some have attacked the patriotism of lawyers for detainees,"'
those critics fundamentally misunderstand the role that lawyers play in a
constitutional republic. From de Toqueville's time, American lawyers have
been intermediaries who temper the excesses of both the private sector and
government.2 As we shall see in the next subsection, unchecked excesses
promote volatility in governance, leading to the "pendular swings" that Justice
Kennedy cautioned against in his opinion for the Court in Boumediene v. Bush,83
which struck down the Military Commission Act of 2oo6's limits on habeas.
Lawyers who challenge the government promote greater stability in the polity,
by deterring the myopia that could otherwise afflict powerful decisionmakers.
In this fashion, lawyers safeguard the deliberative virtues necessary for
democracy. Teachers who have advocated for detainees model this democratic
understanding of the lawyer's role.
B. TheAdvocate's Peril: Path-Dependence as Social Phenomenon
While the Guantinamo lawyers served constitutional values by bringing
judicial review to Guantinamo, their efforts floundered through a failure to
understand social phenomena that influence law's implementation, including
path-dependence.84 Ironically, Bush Administration officials who had authored
the unilateral policies the Guantinamo lawyers challenged made the same
mistake. Neither appreciated that since where we were influences where we are
79. See Guantinamo Lawyers, supra note 73, at 68-70 (discussing trip to Guantinamo with
Professor Martha Rayner).
8o. Id. at 25-26 (observations by Hofstra Law School habeas expert Eric M. Freedman regarding
death penalty lawyers' early, formative role in Guantinamo representation).
81. See John Schwartz, Attacks on Detainee Lawyers Split Conservatives, N.Y. Times, Mar.
1o, 2oo, at At (noting attacks by Liz Cheney, daughter of the former vice president, on
Obama Administration officials who had earlier represented Guantinamo detainees, as well
as defense of those officials by noted conservatives like Kenneth Starr, who had served as
independent counsel investigating President Clinton).
82. See Rakesh K. Anand, The Role of the Lawyer in American Democracy, 77 Fordham L. Rev.
1611, 1620-21 (2009).
83. 533 U.S. at 7 42.
84. Cf Adrian Vermeule, Law and the Limits of Reason io8-no (Oxford Univ. Press 2008)
(discussing path-dependence in common law adjudication); Oona A. Hathaway, Path
Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law
System, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 6o, 606-22 (2001) (same).
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going, the consequences of an earlier choice may permanently alter subsequent
options. For legal education to break decisively from doctrinalism, a thorough
understanding of theoretical constructs like path-dependence should inform
pedagogical practice.
To understand path-dependence, consider the following hypothetical.
Suppose an official can consult with stakeholders at Time i, or delay
consultation until Time 2. Consultation at Time i could solidify stakeholders'
allegiance. Conversely, a failure to consult could solidify mistrust. Moreover,
the failure to consult yields opportunity costs. The level of consultation that
could have engendered agreement at Time i will not satisfy stakeholders at
Time 2. Securing consent becomes that much more expensive, requiring even
greater official concessions.
The Bush Administration learned this lesson the hard way. Its early
intransigence alienated the courts, convincing them that more accountability
was necessary. More timely concessions by the administration might have
triggered greater judicial deference.'5
Unfortunately, advocates for Guantinamo detainees who celebrated the
election of President Obama did not appreciate that consultation is important
not only for ramping up aggressive policies, but also for winding down those
measures. Advocates pushed for President Obama's early announcement
that he would close Guantinamo by January 2o, 200.6 Troubled by the
administration's failure to consult, Congress enacted legislation that impeded
closure efforts.87 While within a few months President Obama articulated a
85. See Goldsmith, Terror Presidency, supra note 27, at 139 (arguing that if Bush Administration
had complied with rudimentary Geneva Convention requirements in the twenty months
after September i, it would have "avoided the more burdensome procedural.. requirements
that became practically necessary under the pressure of subsequent judicial review").
86. See § 2(b), Executive Order, Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at
the Guantinamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities, Jan. 22, 2009
[hereinafter Executive Order], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
closureofGuantinamodetentionfacilities/; cf Peter Margulies, Putting Guantinamo in the
Rear-View Mirror: The Political Economy of Detention Policy, 32 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 339,
354 (2oo); Ken Gude, Getting Back on Track to Close Guantinamo 3 (Center for American
Progress Nov. 2009), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/oog/ I/gitmo.
on-track.html (discussing presidential announcement and aftermath); Sarah Mendelson,
The Guantinamo Countdown, Foreign Pol'y, Oct. j, 2009, available at http://www.
foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/1o/oi/theGuantAnamo-countdown?page=o,I&%24Versi
on=o&%2 4 Path=/&%24 Domain=.foreignpolicy.com,%20%24Version%3Do (same).
87. Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2oo9, Pub. L. No. 111-32, H.R. 2346, § 14104(a) (2oog)
("None of the funds made available in this or any prior Act may be used to release an
individual who is detained as of the date of enactment of this Act, at Naval Station,




fuller strategy that may yet produce agreement," the haste of the original
closure announcement spawned mistrust. As of December, 2010, Guantinamo
is still here, with no augurs of its demise any time soon.9
Path-dependence also reveals that detainee advocates were victims of
their own success. The story of Guantinamo currently stretches over two
generations: pre- and post-Boumediene. Before the Supreme Court's decision
in Boumediene, which upheld detainees' access to habeas corpus, establishing
a definitive right to judicial review was central to the advocates' task. In the
second, post-Boumediene generation, attention shifted to securing the release
of advocates' individual clients. To make the case for judicial review, detainee
advocates deployed what I have elsewhere called the "misadventure thesis"-
the claim that all detainees were in the wrong place at the wrong time.9o This
narrative helped prompt the courts to establish a framework for judicial
review.91 However, this overarching narrative has not ensured that those rights
would result in release in particular cases.
The first-generation narrative has undermined detainee advocates' second-
generation agenda because some (although not all) of the remaining 170
detainees have ties to the Taliban or Al Qaeda that make the misadventure
thesis inappropriate.92 Advocates have discovered that rights facilitate
consideration of the merits of cases, but do not guarantee favorable results.
Indeed, the discontinuity between the misadventure thesis and the messier
facts of individual cases may have actually produced greaterjudicial skepticism
than would otherwise have been the case. 93 Appreciating the effects of path-
dependence would have encouraged habeas lawyers to frame a more nuanced
thesis in first-generation Guantinamo efforts, to reduce the skepticism they
have sometimes encountered in second-generation litigation.94
88. See Obama, Protecting Our Security, supra note 14.
89. See Charlie Savage, Closing Guantinamo Fades as a Priority, N.Y Times, June 26, 201o, at
Ai3 .
9o. See Margulies, Advocacy Strategies, supra note 76, at 403-05.
g. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534 (2004) (requiring due process safeguards for
detention of presumptive American citizens in part to reduce incidence of false positives,
such as detention of an "errant tourist, embedded journalist, or local aid worker").
92. See Wittes, The Long War, supra note x8, at 74-90; Glaberson & Williams, supra note 18.
93. This is hard to measure. However, the court in at least one detainee case expressed skepticism
when advocates advanced a position that clashed with earlier arguments. See Hamdan
v. Gates, 565 F Supp. ad 130, 137 (D.D.C. 2oo8) (declining to enjoin pending military
commission proceeding authorized by Congress, in case where advocates had argued that
earlier military commission was flawed because it lacked statutory authorization).
94. The overselling of narratives is a persistent risk in many advocacy arenas. Some have pivoted
to protect against this danger. For example, informed opponents of capital punishment
concede that lists of "'the exonerated' include defendants who were not wholly blameless."
See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence: The Attraction
and Limitations of the Focus on Innocence in Capital Punishment Law and Advocacy,
95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 587, 597-98 (2005). With a better understanding of path-
dependence, lawyers can reduce backlash and other unintended consequences, and more
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C. The Significance ofStructure in Government Responses to Terror
The academy also needs to pay closer attention to the role of government
structure in counterterrorism measures. Structure can dictate substance, or at
least exert a powerful influence. However, those outcomes remain invisible or
unexplained if the student does not know where to look.
Consider here the assertion by Margulies and Metcalf that the government's
poor response to Hurricane Katrina was unrelated to counterterrorism
policy.95 A more probing look at bureaucratic structures suggests a significant,
albeit oblique, link between the government's response to Katrina and the
war on terror.96 The politics of the war on terror underwrote creation of
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) from a patchwork quilt of
agencies with radically disparate missions, including the former Immigration
and Naturalization Service, the Coast Guard, and the Federal Emergency
Management Administration (FEMA). Predictably, activities related to
national security received a healthy helping of the budgetary pie, while
officials siphoned off resources from other vital missions, such as emergency
response to natural disasters.97 Senior bureaucracy at DHS focused on terror,
and lacked background in emergency response. Without an appreciation for
the importance of this mission, critical jobs went to unqualified patronage
hires, like Michael Brown, who assumed leadership of FEMA even though his
most useful experience with natural disasters had been heading the Arabian
Horses Association.98 These structural features foretold the cascade of errors
in the government's Katrina response.
Structural concerns have also contributed to other policy glitches.
For example, the war on terror provided an opening for former Attorney
General John Ashcroft's evisceration of immigration adjudication.99 Today,
a structural mismatch between adjudication and enforcement resources
continues to plague immigration law. Enforcement resources have grown, as
the apprehension, detention, and removal of undocumented aliens and other
non-citizens became a growth industry. However, adjudication, like emergency
effectively ensure the flourishing of innovation. See Charles F Sabel & William H. Simon,
Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1015 (2oo4)
(describing public law remedies that promote innovation); but see Scott L. Cummings &
Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 1235, 13I7-27 (2010)
(arguing that backlash has not been significant consequence of same-sex equality litigation).
95. See Margulies & Metcalf, supra note 8, at 439.
96. See Margulies, Law's Detour, supra note 2, at i-23.
97. See Dara Kay Cohen, Mariano-Florentino Cuellar & Barry R. Weingast, Crisis Bureaucracy:
Homeland Security and the Political Design of Legal Mandates, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 673, 725-26
(2oo6).
98. SeeJuliette Kayyem, Appointments that Disappoint, L.A. Times, Sept. 12, 2005, at Bi.
99. See Margulies, Law's Detour, supra note 2, at 30-33; Linda Kelly Hill, Holding the Due
Process Line for Asylum, 36 Hofstra L. Rev. 85 (2007); Shruti Rana, "Streamlining" the Rule
of Law: How the Department of Justice is Undermining Judicial Review of Agency Action,
2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. 829 (2009).
393
Journal ofLegal Education
management, remained a bureaucratic orphan in the Justice Department,
chronically starved of resources and capacity. The result was a burgeoning
immigration backlogloo that thwarted accurate adjudication."o
Similarly, opportunity costs have burgeoned through the takeover of criminal
prosecution by immigration imperatives.o Prosecutions of non-citizens for
illegal re-entry into the country and other minor offenses, like individual
cases of immigration fraud, now account for a substantial percentage of all
federal prosecutions.03 Federal prosecutors who must pursue these cases, the
bulk of which involve nonviolent offenders, lose the opportunity to pursue
other forms of illegal conduct, including organized crime, drug trafficking,
and fraud.1o4 That might be a sensible strategy, or a bad bargain. Students can
make ajudgment only if teachers and scholars flag the issue.
Structural factors also help explain the spike in criminal cases involving
terrorism. Prosecutors have had to compete for resources and bureaucratic
standing with agencies such as the Pentagon and the CIA that use different
measures to counter terror. Material support prosecutions help prosecutors
demonstrate their continued relevance.'o5 However, prosecutors' focus on
informant-driven prosecutions may have opportunity costs. While informants
are good at enticing big talkers into incriminating statements, they may be
ineffective at targeting more disciplined types who can do more damage.
Indeed, some of these more dangerous individuals may use informant status
to cloak their own activities.'o6 Who informs on the informants is a worthy
oo. SeeJulia Preston, Immigration Agency Ends Some Deportations, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 2010,
at A14 (citing study indicating record backlog of 247,922 cases, with an average waiting time
for a hearing Of 45 9 days).
io. On the effects of backlogs in asylum cases, seeJaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz
& Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 6o Stan. L. Rev.
295 (2007).
102. See Margulies, Law's Detour, supra note 2, at 88-89.
103. SeeTRAC Immigration, Immigration Enforcement Under Obama Returns to Highs of Bush
Era, available at http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/2 3 3/ (noting that in April 2oo, the
Border Patrol referred 7,822 new cases to federal prosecutors, most involving charges that
noncitizens had illegally attempted to reenter the United States after their removal).
104. See Margulies, Law's Detour, supra note 2, at 89.
105. Cf Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy, supra note 39, at 430-33 (discussing bureaucratic
crosscurrents within counterterrorism agencies).
106. SeeJane Perlez, Eric Schmitt & Ginger Thompson, U.S. Had Warnings on Plotter of Mumbai
Attack, N.Y Times, Oct. 17, 2oo, at At (reporting that David Headley, who has pleaded
guilty to conspiracy regarding the deadly 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, had developed
contacts with militants in 2oo2, possibly while he was still working as an informant for the
Drug Enforcement Agency, and that U.S. officials had failed to act on warnings of Headley's
terrorist ties).
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question, but structural competition gives prosecutors little incentive to answer
it. Here, too, students can better gauge whether incentives are adequate once
teachers highlight the issue.o7
Conclusion
The legal academy's response to September ii has been far more robust
than its responses to most earlier occasions for government overreaching.
On some fronts such as detention with judicial review, Guantinamo's second
generation has seen a welcome substantive convergence favoring measures
that balance security with the rule of law. Other areas have seen a less salutary
methodological convergence on the familiar confines of doctrinalism. Teaching
and scholarship on doctrinally salient matters like detention of suspected
terrorists apprehended within the United States has overwhelmed teaching
and analysis of issues that affect more people, such as criminal prosecutions
under the federal material support statutes. Doctrinalism's influence has given
both scholars and law students a skewed vision of counterterrorism measures.
To correct this distorted lens, law schools should curb doctrinalism's reach.
They can do so with three measures. First, they can stress clinics as resources
teaching advocacy for the unpopular. Second, they can pay greater attention
to social phenomena like path-dependence. Third, they can study and teach
about the links between governmental structure and legal policy. Taking these
steps will help lawyers of the future deal more effectively with terrorism and its
legal consequences.
107. Scholars who discuss the political economy of legislation and law enforcement have made
vital contributions to this understanding. See Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime:
How the War on Crime Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture of
Fear (Oxford Univ. Press soo7) (noting influence of both official rhetoric and patronage
concerns); cf William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, oo Mich.
L. Rev. 505 (2001) (describing dynamics of enacting federal criminal statutes); Daniel
Richman, Decisions About Coercion: The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege Waiver
Problem, 57 DePaul L. Rev. 295, 317 (2008) (arguing that legislature can counter court-
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